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TAXATION-FEDERAL INcoME TAX-EXTENT To WmCH A DIVIDEND IN
KINn 1s OimINARY INCOME UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE1-Taxpayer, a
corpo_rate shareholder, received from the corporation a distribution of property
which had appreciated in value over its adjusted cost. The earnings and profits of
the corporation were sufficient to cover the adjusted cost of the property distributed, but were not sufficient to cover its full fair market value at the time of distribution. The Tax Court held that the fair market value of the distribution was
taxable as a dividend only to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits.
On appeal, held, reversed. In determining whether a distribution in kind is a
dividend under section 115(a), the earnings and profits of the corporation are
to be charged with the adjusted basis of the property distributed, without regard
to any unrealized appreciation in its value. Since the corporation's earnings
and profits were sufficient to cover the adjusted cost of the property herein
distributed, the entire distribution is a dividend, and is taxable, under section
115(j), to the full extent of its fair market value at the time of distribution.
Commissioner 11. Hirshon Trust, (2d Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 523; Commissioner
11. Godley's Estate, (3d Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 529.
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as under the 1939 code, distributions of property by a corporation to its shareholders constitute dividends, taxable
to the latter as ordinary income, provided that the corporation has earnings and
profits sufficient to cover the distribution at the close of the taxable year in

1

Unless otherwise indicated, all references to code provisions in the text are references

to the 1939 code.
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which it is made.2 If a given distribution is a dividend in kind, it is gross
income to the shareholder in an amount equal to its fair market value.3 The
problem presented by the principal case, however, has been the subject of disagreement among the courts. Its solution turns upon whether sections I IS(a)
and (b), which determine the character of a distribution, also determine the
extent to which a dividend in kind is subject to dividend taxation. Until quite
recently, the courts generally have held that that portion of the fair market value
of the property distributed which is in excess of the corporation's earnings and
profits should first be applied to reduce the basis of the distributee's stock, any
balance being taxable as a capital gain.4 These cases rest upon the theory that
sections 115(a) and (b) not only determine the character of the distribution,
but also measure the extent to which a dividend in kind is ordinary income.
This analysis proceeds as follows: (1) there can be a taxable dividend only to
the extent that earnings and profits are available for distribution in the taxable
year; 5 (2) unrealized appreciation over cost of the distributed property does not
constitute earnings and profits to the distributing corporation;6 (3) since unrealized appreciation in the value of the property distributed is excluded in
measuring the corporation's earnings and profits for the purpose of determining
the extent to which the distribution is a dividend, it likewise should be excluded
in determining how much of the distribution is subject to dividend taxation. 7
The better view, however, would appear to be that propounded in the principal
cases. Where the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation are sufficient to cover the adjusted cost of the property distributed, the distributee is
taxable under section 115(j) upon the full fair market value of the property
distributed, notwithstanding the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation are insufficient to cover its appreciation in value over cost.8 These cases
rest upon the theory that for purposes of characterizing a distribution as a
dividend, the sole relevant test is from the standpoint of the distributing corporation, and from that standpoint the fair market value of the property distributed

I.R.C. (1939), §§22(a), 115(a) and (b); I.R.C. (1954), §§301, 316(a).
a I.R.C. (1939), §1150); I.R.C. (1954), §30l(b).
4 I.R.C. (1939), §115(d); R. D. Merrill Co., 4 T.C. 955 (1945); Jane Easton Bradley,
9 T.C. 115 (1947); Paulina du Pont Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947. National Carbon Co.,
2 T.C. 57 (1943), by implication upholds this view. Commissioner v. Timken, (6th Cir.
1944) 141 F. (2d) 625, is also cited for this proposition, although it does not actually so
hold. Cf. Raum, "Dividends in Kind: Their Tax Aspects," 63 HARv. L. REv. 593 at
608 (1950).
5 I.R.C. (1939), §§115(a) and (b); R. D. Merrill Co., note 4 supra; Jane Easton
Bradley, note 4 supra; Paulina du Pont Dean, note 4 supra.
6 General Utilities and Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185
(1935); Jane Easton Bradley, note 4 supra; Paulina du Pont Dean, note 4 supra.
7 Jane Easton Bradley, note 4 supra; Paulina du Pont Dean, note 4 supra.
8 See Binzel v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 989, cert. den. 296 U.S.
579, 56 S.Ct. 90 (1935); Commissioner v. Wakefield, (6th Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 280;
Equitable Securities Corp. v. United States, (D.C. Tenn. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 722.
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is immaterial.9 Therefore, if earnings and profits of the distributing corporation
are sufficient to cover the adjusted cost of the property distributed, the entire
distribution is a dividend. Once it is determined, however, that the distribution
is a dividend, its amount is governed solely by section 115(j), and for that
purpose the earnings and profits of the corporation are immaterial.10 Since
section l 15(j) is simply a valuation provision which is applicable only after it is
determined that a given distribution is a dividend, it would appear that sections
115(a) and (b) do not determine the extent to which a dividend in kind is
ordinary income. If such were the case, section 115(j) would be superfluous.
Under the 1954 code, however, the provision defining a dividend in kind11
may be interpreted to determine the extent to which a dividend in kind is
ordinary income. Whereas the 1939 code first defines a dividend in kind12
and then provides for its valuation,18 the 1954 code first provides for a determination of the amount for the distribution14 and then provided that that portion
of the distribution which is a dividend shall be included in gross income.15
Under the new code, therefore, it could be said that only that portion of the
distribution which may be charged against the corporation's earnings and profits
is taxable as a dividend.16 Since under the new code only the adjusted basis of
the property distributed may be charged against the earnings and profits of the
corporation, 17 unrealized appreciation in the value of such property may be said
to be taxable as a dividend only to the extent that there are earnings or profits
from other sources sufficient to cover it.18 It must be noted, however, that the
language of section 30l(c)(I), I.R.C. (1954), does not preclude the courts
from applying the theory applied in the principal cases if they so desire.

Alice Austin, S.Ed.
9 Since unrealized appreciation in value of corporate assets may not be added to earnings and profits (General Utilities and Operating Co. v. Helvering, note 6 supra) in determining whether a distribution in kind is a dividend under §ll5(a), I.R.C. (1939), it may
not be subtracted therefrom. Cf. Raum, "Dividends in Kind: Their Tax Aspects," 63
HAnv. L. REv. 593 at 609 (1950).
10 Ibid.
llJ.R.C. (1954), §316(a).
121.R.C. (1939), §§ll5(a) and (b).
1s I.R.C. (1939), §ll5(j).
14 I.R.C. (1954), §301(b)(l).
15 I.R.C. (1954), §301(c)(I).
16Jn this connection, see proposed Treas. Reg. §1.301-l(a), 19 Fl!D. REG. 8237 (Dec.
11, 1954).
11 I.R.C. (1954), §312(a)(3).
is I.R.C. (1954), §316(a); National Carbon Co., note 4 supra.

